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CRIMINAL LAW-RETROACTIVITY-JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CONSE-
QUENCES OF A VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY By REASON OF IN-
SANITY-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that its deter-
mination that a jury be informed of the consequences of a verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity not be applied retroactively and,
more specifically, not to a case on direct appeal at the time of that
decision.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Geschwendt, 500 Pa. 120, 454
A.2d 991 (1982).
On March 12, 1976, at approximately 8:30 a.m., George
Geschwendt broke into the residence of the Abt family.'
Geschwendt lived across the street from the Abts with his mother,
who had gone to work that morning.' He carried with him into the
Abt home a .22 caliber gun and ammunition which he had pur-
chased and falsely reported stolen on the day of purchase.3 No one
was present in the Abt home at the time Geschwendt illegally en-
tered the residence.4 In entering, Geschwendt broke a kitchen win-
dow but subsequently cleaned up the glass and then positioned
himself such that he was able simultaneously to view both the
kitchen and front door entrances.5 Geschwendt lay in wait for ap-
proximately six hours, and then as the members of the Abt family
arrived home, he successively shot and killed five of them, as well
as the boyfriend of one of the Abts.1
Geschwendt dragged the bodies to the basement.7 He also
cleaned up the blood after each shooting.' One of the Abts had the
opportunity to complete a phone call before Geschwendt shot and
killed her." Geschwendt left the Abt residence and returned home
by a circuitous route after the Abt telephone began to ring repeat-
edly, arousing Geschwendt's fear of being discovered.10
1. Commonwealth v. Geschwendt, 500 Pa. 120, 123, 454 A.2d 991, 992-93 (1982).
2. Id. at 123, 454 A.2d at 99 3. Geschwendt also had a brother who resided with his








10. Id. Two members of the Abt family had not arrived home at that point and sur-
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Geschwendt concealed the gun and his bloody clothing in the
saddlebags of his motorcycle which he kept locked in his garage. 1
The next day Geschwendt drove a considerable distance to the
Delaware River where he discarded the shoes and rubber gloves he
had worn the previous day.' Geschwendt washed his clothing to
remove any bloodstains and gave it to the Goodwill Industries. 5
On March 16, Geschwendt disposed of the gun, spent shell casings,
and remainder of the live ammunition into a nearby creek from
which police later recovered the gun."'
Approximately one week after the Abt killings, Geschwendt was
asked by the local police to come to police headquarters to be
questioned about the alleged theft of his gun. A polygraph test
given to Geschwendt on March 22 indicated he was giving decep-
tive answers. 6 That evening, when told of the polygraph test re-
sults, Geschwendt confessed and gave a full and detailed account
of the killings, as well as his activities prior and subsequent to the
killings.'
7
Geschwendt was convicted at jury trial of murder in the first de-
gree.'" The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that, in-
ter alia, the trial judge properly charged the jury that it could
bring in verdicts of guilty of murder in the first degree, or not
guilty by reason of insanity.'9 Adhering to the law prevailing at
that time, the trial judge had refused Geschwendt's request that
the jury be instructed as to the consequences of a verdict of not
vived as a result of Geschwendt's early departure. Id.
11. Id. at 124, 454 A.2d at 993.





17. Id. Geschwendt gave a stenographically recorded confession after his arraignment
that evening. He stated to police that he was sorry he was unable to remain in the house
long enough to kill all the members of the Abt family as he had intended. Id.
18. Id. at 122, 454 A.2d at 991. See Commonwealth v. Geschwendt, Nos. 939-944
(Court of Common Pleas, Bucks County 1976).
19. 271 Pa. Super. at 102-05, 412 A.2d at 595-96. The superior court also held that: (1)
the trial court adequately instructed on the definition of insanity; (2) the exclusion of attor-
neys and physicians from the array of jurors did not prevent defendant from receiving a fair
trial; (3) the trial judge did not unduly and erroneously restrict defendant's voir dire exami-
nation of prospective jurors; (4) defendant was not entitled to a change of venue; (5) it was
not error to admit photographs depicting bloodstained rugs, clothing and the body of one of
the victims; and (6) the record established that the stenographically transcribed confession
was not involuntarily induced. Id. at 105-08, 412 A.2d at 597-98.
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guilty by reason of insanity. 20 Subsequently, in the case of Com-
monwealth v. Mulgrew, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deter-
mined that a trial judge should charge the jury as to the conse-
quences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.22 The
superior court declined Geschwendt's request to apply Mulgrew to
his circumstance, stating that new decisions are not to be applied
retroactively unless constitutional issues are involved.2 The supe-
rior court saw no constitutional issue present in Mulgrew and,
therefore, refused to apply that decision retroactively to
Geschwendt.
24
Judge Manderino filed a dissenting opinion stating his belief
that Geschwendt was entitled to relief under the tenets of Mul-
grew.2 5 He opined that the jury should have had the benefit of the
requested charge so as to assure a fully informed decision.26 Con-
trary to the majority's rationale regarding retroactively, Judge
Manderino stated that whether an issue is constitutional or not is
not a fair way to determine whether relief is indicated.2 7
Geschwendt appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania re-
questing a new trial based on numerous allegations of error. 28
Justice Nix, writing for the plurality,2 9 focused on the applicabil-
ity of the holding in Mulgrew to Geschwendt's circumstances and
the trial court's refusal to charge the jury upon the defense's re-
quest as to the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of
20. Id. at 105, 412 A.2d at 597.
21. 475 Pa. 271, 380 A.2d 349 (1977).
22. Id. at 275, 380 A.2d at 351.
23. 271 Pa. Super. at 105, 412 A.2d at 597 (citing Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa.
102, 381 A.2d 1245 (1977)).
24. 271 Pa. Super. at 105, 412 A.2d at 597.
25. Id. at 108, 412 A.2d at 598 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 500 Pa. at 122 n.2, 454 A.2d at 992 n.2. Geschwendt, in addition to the alleged
error regarding the court's failure to give the requested instruction, alleged five additional
instances of error: (1) failure to suppress his confession; (2) refusal of requests for a charge
of alternative tests of insanity; (3) admission of color photographs of the crime scene; (4)
allowing the testimony of a prosecution psychiatrist; and (5) denial of a request for a change
of venue. Geschwendt also challenged the constitutionality of 17 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1333
(1982) which exempts attorneys and physicians from jury duty, and claimed a denial of due
process in the restriction of voir dire. The superior court considered and denied the afore-
mentioned allegations of error at Commonwealth v. Geschwendt, 271 Pa. Super. 102, 412
A.2d 595 (1979).
29. 500 Pa. at 124, 454 A.2d at 993. Justices Larsen, McDermott and Hutchinson con-
curred in result. Id. at 135, 454 A.2d at 998. Chief Justice O'Brien and Justices Roberts and
Flaherty dissented. Id.
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insanity.30 Justice Nix noted that the court had originally rejected
the approach taken in Mulgrew and that the law of Pennsylvania
had been embodied in Commonwealth v. Gable, which held that
the jury had nothing to do with the trial judge's duty to send the
defendant to a state institution, and thus it was not error to refuse
to so inform them." He further explained that a unanimous deci-
sion in Mulgrew rejected as simplistic the Gable view that punish-
ment was not the concern of the jury and that no explanation was
required to be given to them.3 2 Justice Nix noted that
Geschwendt's trial was concluded on July 19, 1976, and the opin-
ion in Mulgrew was not filed until December 1, 1977; therefore,
absent a determination that Mulgrew be applied retroactively,
Geschwendt was not entitled to the requested point of charge. s
Faced with the question of whether a change in law should be
applied to those cases still on direct review at the time of a new
pronouncement, the court noted that neither the federal nor state
constitution dictated a certain result.s" The deliberations of the
United States Supreme Court and views expressed by its members
were considered by the plurality to be informative but not control-
ling since the court perceived the matter to be one of purely state
law. Thus, it was not necessary that the state court anticipate the
Supreme Court's view as to the appropriate effect to be given the
new pronouncement.3 5
Justice Nix noted that the application of a new rule to cases
such as Geschwendt's which are on direct review at the time of the
decision found support early in our national history. Chief Justice
Marshall, in the'seminal case of United States v. Schooner
Peggy,s6 articulated the view that a law, passed subsequent to
judgment but before decision by an appellate court, must be given
effect, even it if it necessary to set the judgment aside.3 7 Justice
30. Id. at 124, 454 A.2d at 993.
31. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Gable, 323 Pa. 449, 453, 187 A. 393, 395 (1936)).
32. Id. at 125, 454 A.2d at 994. See Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271, 275, 380
A.2d 349, 351 (1977), where it was held that when insanity is raised as a possible defense to
criminal charges, a jury must be instructed concerning the possible psychiatric treatment
and commitment of the defendant after the return of a verdict of not guilty be reason of
insanity. Id.
33. 500 Pa. at 125, 454 A.2d at 994.
34. Id. at 127, 454 A.2d at 995. "[T]he Constitution neither prohibits nor requires
retrospective effect." (citing United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542 (1982)).
35. 500 Pa. at 128, 454 A.2d at 995.
36. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
37. Id. at 110.
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Nix explained that Justice Harlan, in Mackey v. United States,"8
had articulated the rule of limited retrospectivity, firmly stating
that the law must be applied as it is at the time and not as it once
was.
8 9
Justice Nix also noted that the recent 5-4 United States Su-
preme Court decision in United States v. Johnson40 reaffirmed the
viability of limited retrospectivity with respect to convictions not
yet final at the time the decision was rendered. 41 Justice Nix addi-
tionally stated, however, that Johnson had limited applicability to
the instant circumstances.'
The Geschwendt plurality indicated that the retroactive applica-
tion to matters on direct appeal mandated by Johnson related to
decisions that were constitutionally compelled.'3 Conversely, the
court did not recognize any constitutional overtones in its decision
to set aside the long-standing Gable view in favor of the pro-
nouncement in Mulgrew.44 The court viewed its decision in Mul-
grew as an exercise of its supervisory authority, and it further
opined that where a change in state practice was the only concern,
the decision-making consistency required in the application of con-
stitutionally-compelled decisions was not necessary.4" The
Geschwendt plurality further noted that even where the change
was constitutionally compelled the Johnson court required non-
retroactivity where the new rule represented a clear break with the
past.
46
Justice Nix observed that the United States Supreme Court also
has required non-retroactive application of newly articulated rules
of criminal procedure declared to be a clear break with the past.7
Justice Nix, while identifying this second type of case, noted that
38. 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
39. 500 Pa. at 129, 454 A.2d 996. In Mackey v. United States, Justice Harlan stated, "a
proper perception of our duties as a court of law, charged with applying the Constitution to
resolve every legal dispute within our jurisdiction on direct review, mandates that we apply
the law as it is at the time, not as it once was." 401 U.S. at 681.
40. 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
41. 500 Pa. at 130, 454 A.2d at 996.
42. Id.
43. Id. Johnson specifically considered fourth amendment violations.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 130, 454 A.2d at 996-97.
47. Id. at 131, 454 A.2d at 997. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 547 n.5
(1975) (considerations of judicial integrity and deterrence of unlawful police conduct re-
quired non-retroactive application); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969) (deci-
sions of retroactive application of new law determined by three Stovall factors).
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the determinative aspect calling for non-retrospectivity was the
clear break with the past more so than the particular traits of the
new rule."8 Further, once it is established that the new rule is un-
anticipated, he observed, two of the three factors identified in
Stovall v. Denno,'49 reliance by law enforcement authorities on the
old standards and the effect on the administration of justice, virtu-
ally compel a finding of non-retroactivity. Justice Nix concluded
that a finding of prospectivity was indicated even if Mulgrew had
been constitutionally compelled because the change at issue was an
unequivocal example of a "clear break with the past" as character-
ized in Desist v. United States.50 He explained that a decision of
prospectivity would also be consistent with the dissent in
Johnson."
The four member dissent in Johnson had espoused retroactive
application only where the rule change affected an aspect of the
criminal trial that so impaired the truth finding process that the
accuracy of a guilty verdict was in doubt.52 Finding this support in
the Johnson dissent, Mulgrew was viewed by the plurality as rep-
resenting a refinement in practice and not a correction of a serious
flaw in the fact finding process.53 The plurality asserted that an
appropriate indication of retroactivity was based on an examina-
tion of the history, purpose and effect of the new rule, as well as
any inequity or disruption that would result from retroactive
application.5
It was, however, recognized by the court that there is strong sup-
port for the view that even-handed justice requires application of
the new rule to litigants similarly situated.5 5 Nevertheless, the
48. 500 Pa. at 131, 454 A.2d at 997 (citing Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 659
(1971), a plurality opinion in which the Court stated that the "new constitutional interpre-
tations ... so change the law that prospectivity is arguably the proper course").
49. 500 Pa. at 131, 454 A.2d at 997. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) articulated
the considerations pertinent to the retrospectivity issue: "(a) the purpose to be served by
the new standards (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of
the new standards." Id. at 297. See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
50. 500 Pa. at 131, 454 A.2d at 997. See Desist, 394 U.S. at 248.
51. 500 Pa. at 131, 454 A.2d at 997.
52. Id. (citing Johnson, 457 U.S. at 564 (Justice White, with whom Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor joined, dissented)).
53. 500 Pa. at 132-33, 454 A.2d at 997-98 (citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97
(1971)). The plurality also considered unsound the Blackstonian theory that the court's role
is not to "pronounce a new law but to maintain and expand the old one." 500 Pa. at 132 n.6,
454 A.2d at 997 n.6 (citing 1 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 69 (15th ed. 1809)).
54. 500 Pa. at 132-33, 454 A.2d at 997-98.
55. Id. at 133-34, 454 A.2d at 998. The court quoted from Desist, 394 U.S. 244, 258-59
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court considered the even-handed justice argument to be one-sided
in favor of the disappointed litigant, while being of the opinion
that this same viewpoint ignored the court's responsibility to pro-
vide a fair system of justice for society. 6 So as to ensure fairness to
both the litigant and to society as a whole, the court settled on a
balancing approach which weighs the litigant's interest in securing
the benefit of the change against the purposes intended to be ac-
complished by the change, as well as the impact of a retrospective
application upon the system."
Justice Nix noted that in Commonwealth v. Brown" the lan-
guage of the opinion of Justice Roberts was phrased in terms of a
retrospective application of Mulgrew, thus affording relief to Mr.
Brown, whose case was on direct review at the time of the Mulgrew
decision. According to Justice Nix, the prosecution in Brown inten-
tionally misled the jury by suggesting during closing argument that
a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity would result in the
immediate release of the defendant.59 Justice Nix viewed the facts
of Brown as justifying the result reached without applying Mul-
grew retroactively. Further, he explicitly disavowed that part of
Brown which called for per se retroactivity of a new rule to cases
on direct review at the time of the new pronouncement."
The fact that Geschwendt's trial occurred after the trial in Mul-
grew was of no moment to the court, since the operative fact was
considered to be the time when the new rule was announced and
not when the trial occurred.' The trial court in both Geschwendt
and Mulgrew labored under the then valid rule of Gable and were
thus controlled by the same.2
In conclusion, the plurality saw Mulgrew as a clear break with
(1969) which stated:
when another similarly situated defendant comes before us, we must grant the same
relief or give a principled reason for acting differently. We depart from this basic
judicial tradition when we simply pick and choose from among similarly situated de-
fendants those who alone will receive the benefit of a "new" rule of constitutional
law.
500 Pa. at 134, 454 A.2d at 998.
56. 500 Pa. at 134, 454 A.2d at 999.
57. Id.
58. 494 Pa. 380, 431 A.2d 905 (1981). The Brown court extended the benefit of the
Mulgrew decision to appellant Brown as his conviction was not yet final at the time of the
Mulgrew pronouncement. Id. at 386, 431 A.2d at 908.
59. 500 Pa. at 134, 454 A.2d at 999.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 135, 454 A.2d at 999.
62. Id.
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the former law and, when balanced against the impact of a retro-
spective application upon the system, the plurality determined
that Mulgrew would be applied only to those cases where the trial
ruling occurred after the filing of the Mulgrew decision.63 The pro-
spective application of Mulgrew thus denied Geschwendt relief,
and the trial court's refusal to give the requested instructions was
left undisturbed."
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Roberts joined by Chief Justice
O'Brien and Justice Flaherty, asserted that the decision of the
court did not depend upon the application of the Mulgrew or
Brown decisions but rather rested on Pennsylvania law - the
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 196665 which essen-
tially reenacted a statute well over a century old. 6 Justice Roberts
observed that the plurality focused exclusively on the trial court's
refusal to explain the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity. 7 Justice Roberts contended that the plurality
ignored what he viewed as the critical fact of the simultaneous trial
court refusal to honor the fundamental request of Geschwendt that
the jury be instructed regarding the possibility of a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity." In Justice Roberts' opinion, substan-
tial evidence of Geschwendt's sanity was offered by both sides at
trial, and Geschwendt's sanity was a central issue which statutorily
entitled Geschwendt to the instruction to the jury that it could
return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.69 Justice Rob-
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 500 Pa. at 135-36, 454 A.2d at 999-1000 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
66. 50 PA. CONS. STAT § 4413(a) (1966) provides: "Whenever any person charged with
any crime is acquitted on the ground of insanity or having been insane at the time he com-
mitted the crime, the jury or the court as the case may be, shall state such ... " Id.
67. 500 Pa. at 136, 454 A.2d at 1000 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
68. Id. The plurality responded to Justice Roberts' dissent by stating that
Geschwendt's appeal did not question the court's failure to fully set forth for the jury the
alternative verdicts. The plurality noted that Geschwendt's complaint was specifically chal-
lenging the trial court's refusal to explain the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity and did not raise the issue that the jury was not fully aware of the alter-
native verdict. Thus, the plurality stated that the issue was not before the supreme court,
nor was it supported by the record when the charge was read as a whole. Id. at 135 n.8, 454
A.2d at 999 n.8.
69. Id. at 138-39, 454 A.2d at 1001 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing Act of March 31,
1860, P.L. 427, § 66, as amended, 19 P.S. § 1351 (repealed 1978). Section 1351 provides:
In every case in which it shall be given in evidence upon the trial of any person
charged with any crime or misdemeanor, that such person was insane at the time of
the commission of such offence, and he shall be acquitted, the jury shall be required
to find specially whether such person was insane at the time of the commission of
such offence, and to declare whether he was acquitted by them on the ground of such
1128
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erts' examination of the record indicated that the trial court de-
nied Geschwendt's request for that specific charge in violation of
the Mental Health and Retardation Act of 1966.0
Justice Roberts believed that there was a serious prejudicial ef-
fect on the truth determining process because the jury did not pos-
sess the capability to render a full and fair decision.71 Thus, he
argued, the decision of the superior court should have been re-
versed and a new trial granted."
Additionally, Justice Roberts argued that the plurality was pro-
pounding a theory of retroactivity that lacked a sound basis for
application and one that was unresponsive to the proper determi-
nation of the cases.7  He contended that the plurality's viewpoint
was an example of the court picking and choosing among similarly
situated persons which was recently rejected in United States v.
Johnson.7 ' Noting that Geschwendt's post-verdict motions were
pending at the time of the decision in Mulgrew and that included
in those motions was a request for the jury instruction explaining
the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,
Justice Roberts deemed the plurality's action to be little more than
a summary conclusion that, based on a limited analysis Of Mul-
grew, Geschwendt should be denied relief 75 The plurality's ration-
ale that the court should be guided by the history, purpose, and
possible disruption imposed by retroactivity of a new rule, as well
as the court's interest in devising an efficacious scheme of deter-
insanity; and if they shall so find and declare, the court before whom the trial is had
shall order the cost of prosecution to be paid by the county, and shall have the power
to order him to be kept in strict custody, in such place and in such manner as to said
court shall seem fit, at the expense of the county in which the trial is had, so long as
such person shall continue to be of unsound mind.
Id.
70. 500 Pa. at 138, 454 A.2d at 1001 (Roberts, J., dissenting). The Mental Health and
Mental Retardation Act of 1966, 50 PA. CONS. STAT § 4413(a) (1966) provides: "Whenever
any person charged with any crime is acquitted by reason of insanity or having been insane
at the time he committed the crime, the jury or the court as the case may be, shall state
such reason for acquittal in its verdict." Id. This provision essentially reenacted P.L. 427 §
66 (1860), as amended 19 PA. CONST. STAT. § 1351 (repealed 1978).
71. 500 Pa. at 139, 454 A.2d at 1001 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
72. Id. Justice Roberts opined that the jury only had the choice of returning a verdict
of guilty or not guilty because consideration was not fully given to the verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity. Id.
73. Id. at 139, 454 A.2d at 1001-02.
74. Id. at 139-40, 454 A.2d at 1002 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Johnson held that deci-
sional policy of the Supreme Court construing the fourth amendment prospectively is sub-
ject to certain stated exceptions demanding retroactive application to all convictions that
were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered. See 457 U.S. at 557-58.
75. 500 Pa. at 140, 454 A.2d at 1002 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
1984 1129
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mining matters of purely state law, was criticized by Justice Rob-
erts as being exactly that type of ambulatory retroactivily rejected
by the United States Supreme Court in Johnson.71 According to
Justice Roberts, the determination of lawsuits of similarly situated
persons should not depend upon which litigation happened to be
filed first.
77
Justice Roberts also found the court's decision contradictory in
that none of the considerations deemed relevant by the plurality in
announcing its decision, purportedly based on fairness, actually
supported the result reached by the court.a Justice Roberts opined
that if even-handed justice concerned the court, then Geschwendt
deserved the benefit of the same law that the justice stated was
applied on direct appeal to at least three other similarly situated
defendants. 79 Additionally, Justice Roberts was of the opinion that
the purposes intended to be accomplished by the Mulgrew change
would be better accomplished by application, to Geschwendt, of
the law existing (Mulgrew) at the time of his appeal.80 Justice Rob-
erts criticized the plurality's characterization of the decision in
Mulgrew as a refinement of the court's practice. He opined that
the decision was actually one designed to overcome an aspect of
the criminal trial that impaired its truth finding function and
raised questions about the accuracy of past guilty verdicts.81 He
76. Id. The Johnson Court, in regard to the notion of ambulatory retrospectivity
stated:
[Tihe problem is not merely the appearance of inequity, but the actual inequity that
results when the Court chooses which of many similarly situated defendants should
be the chance beneficiary of a retrospectively applied rule. As the persistently voiced
dissatisfaction with the Court's "ambulatory retroactivity doctrine" has revealed ....
until now this Court has not "resolved" this problem so much as it has chosen to
tolerate it. The time for toleration has come to an end.
457 U.S. at 555 n.16 (emphasis supplied).
77. 500 Pa. at 141, 454 A.2d at 1002 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts cited
Justice Nix's opinion in Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 498 Pa. 405, 411, 446 A.2d 1268, 1271
(1982) which stated: "In such an instance it is fair to conclude that all of those litigants were
in the same situation and the outcome of their lawsuit should not depend on a race to the
courthouse." Id.
78. 500 Pa. at 141, 454 A.2d at 1002 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
79. Id. Justice Roberts indicated three other cases in which defendants were similarly
situated to Geschwendt: Commonwealth v. Brown, 494 Pa. 380, 431 A.2d 905 (1981); Com-
monwealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271, 380 A.2d 349 (1977); Commonwealth v. Hastings, 301
Pa. Super. 65, 446 A.2d 1337 (1982), allocatur denied, Oct. 8, 1982.
80. 500 Pa. at 141, 454 A.2d at 1002-03 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 141-42, 454 A.2d at 1003 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing Williams v. United
States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971)). Justice Roberts also relied upon Mulgrew to support his
contentions: "[E]xplaining the consequences of acquittal by reason of insanity to a jury will
assist the jury in properly determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant. By such an
1130 Vol. 22:1121
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additionally observed that where a change in law has been
designed to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substan-
tially impairs its truth finding function, the Supreme Court of the
United States has consistently applied the new rule to all convic-
tions that are not final at the time of the change.
8 2
Responding again to the plurality opinion, Justice Roberts de-
nied that retrospective application of Mulgrew to convictions not
yet final would have an adverse impact upon the system.83 The jus-
tice contended that the number of cases in which the defense of
insanity is used is small, and that the number of cases on direct
review at the time of the Mulgrew decision was negligible." Most
important to Justice Roberts, however, was the fact that the deci-
sion in Mulgrew governs conduct at trial which, unlike pre-trial
conduct of law enforcement authorities, could be corrected by re-
manding for a new trial without disturbing reliance in a pre-ex-
isting standard.5 Justice Roberts pointed out that the trial court
was not compelled by Gable to deny Geschwendt's request for an
appropriate instruction on the consequences of a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity since Gable did not preclude a court
from giving such an instruction. 6 Thus, Justice Roberts concluded
that the plurality's assertion that the trial court had no alternative
but to follow Gable was erroneous.8 7 He criticized the ad hoc bal-
ancing approach suggested by the plurality as only inviting uncer-
tainty and litigation concerning retrospective decisions of the
court." Justice Roberts concluded that, contrary to the plurality's
decision that fairness to society militated against retroactivity,
fairness to the defendant and society could be achieved only by a
uniform application of existing law to all convictions not yet final
instruction we reduce the possibility of compromise verdicts of guilty occasioned by a jury's
misapprehension of 'acquitting' a defendant by reason of insanity." 500 Pa. at 142, 454 A.2d
at 1003 (citing Mulgrew, 475 Pa. at 276, 380 A.2d at 352).
82. 500 Pa. at 142, 454 A.2d at 1003 (citing Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233
(1977); Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972); Williams v. United States, 401
U.S. 646 (1971)).
83. 500 Pa. at 142, 454 A.2d at 1003.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 143 n.8, 454 A.2d at 1003 n.8.
87. Id. Justice Roberts also noted that the plurality's characterization of Mulgrew as
the clearest possible example of a clear break with the past was at odds with its view that
Mulgrew was merely a refinement in practice. Id.
88. Id. at 143, 454 A.2d at 1003. Justice Roberts noted that he agreed with the expres-
sion in Johnson that such an ad hoc approach does not advance but only impedes the fair
administration of justice. Id. (citing 457 U.S. at 547-49).
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at the time of the change,89 and by a grant of a new trial to
Geschwendt as was done in Mulgrew, Brown, and Commonwealth
v. Hastings.e0
The question of whether a new rule adopted by a court in over-
ruling one or more of its earlier decisions should be given merely
prospective effect, or should be given retroactive effect as well, has
been a problematic one for our courts and has provided fertile
ground for judicial and scholarly criticism.9 1 Four general ap-
proaches have evolved in the courts' attempts to properly apply
new rules of law. The first, complete prospectivity, denies the ben-
efit of the new pronouncement to the parties at bar and limits its
applicability to future cases.92 The second approach allows the new
rule to benefit the parties at bar but otherwise limits applicability
to future cases.93 A third approach calls for the application of the
89. See Brown, 494 Pa. at 385-86, 431 A.2d at 908, where the court stated:
Certainly fairness demands that relief be granted not only in the first case which
successfully contests a rule of law but also in all other cases pending on direct appeal
which suffer from the same infirmity. To do otherwise in criminal proceedings is to
impose an unwarranted hardship on defendants which affects their most fundamental
rights of life and liberty, while serving no legitimate societal interest in applying an
offensive law no longer valid.
Id. (citations omitted).
90. 500 Pa. at 144, 454 A.2d at 1004 (Roberts, J., dissenting). See Commonwealth v.
Hastings, 301 Pa. Super. 65, 446 A.2d 1337 (1982), allocatur denied, Oct. 8, 1982).
91. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Tehan v. United States ex rel.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910); R. ALnsarT,
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 877-938 (1976); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAIEs 69-70 (15th ed.
1809); Johnson, Retroactivity in Retrospect, 56 CALIF., L. REV. 1612 (1968); Schwartz, Ret-
roactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Miskin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV.
719 (1966); Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Laws: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA.
L. REV. 201 (1965); Meader, Habeas Corpus and the "Retroactivity" Illusion, 50 VA. L. REV.
1115 (1964); Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision:
Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 650 (1962); Note, The Effect of Overruled and Overruling
Decisions on Intervening Transactions, 47 H~Av. L. REV. 1403 (1934); Note, Linkletter,
Shott and the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64 MICH. L. REV. 832 (1966); Note, Pro-
spective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907
(1962).
92. 500 Pa. at 126, 454 A.2d at 994 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490
(1972); Commonwealth v. Minarik, 493 Pa. 573, 427 A.2d 623 (1981); Commonwealth v.
Gravely, 486 Pa. 194, 404 A.2d 1296 (1979) (plurality opinion); Commonwealth v. Tarver,
467 Pa. 401, 357 A.2d 539 (1976) (opinion announcing decision of the court); Commonwealth
v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142 (1974) (opinion in support of aflirmance); Common-
wealth v. Fowler, 451 Pa. 505, 304 A.2d 124 (1973); Commonwealth v. Milliken, 450 Pa. 310,
300 A.2d 78 (1973); Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 399 Pa. 110, 160 A.2d 215 (1960) (opinion in
support of affirmance)).
93. 500 Pa. at 126, 454 A.2d at 994 (citing Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973);
Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 284-85 (1972) (plurality opinion); DeStefano v. Woods, 392
U.S. 631, 633 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 394
1132
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new rule to cases already final at the time the new rule is
announced.9'
The last general approach, and the one at issue in Geschwendt,
allows for application of the new pronouncement to all future
cases, and to all cases still on direct review when the new rule is
articulated. 95 This view, often termed limited retrospectivily, found
support early in our history as expressed by Chief Justice Marshall
in United States v. Schooner Peggy," where he set forth the pro-
position that the appellate courts must decide cases according to
U.S. 719 (1966)).
94. 500 Pa. at 126-27, 454 A.2d at 994-95 (citing August v. Stasak, 492 Pa. 550, 424
A.2d 1328 (1981); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 490 Pa. 156, 415 A.2d 80 (1980); Mayle v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978) (applied in Steinberg v.
Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Welfare, 480 Pa. 321, 389 A.2d 1086 (1978)); Grieser v.
Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., 480 Pa. 447, 390 A.2d 1263 (1978); Tokar v. Common-
wealth, Dep't of Transp., 480 Pa. 598, 391 A.2d 1046 (1978); Dubree v. Commonwealth, 481
Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978); Kenno v. Commonwealth, Dep't of State Police, 481 Pa. 562,
393 A.2d 304 (1978); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Com-
monwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977) (applied in Commonwealth v. Green,
480 Pa. 446, 390 A.2d 1263 (1978); Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966)).
95. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 337 (1980) (Powell, J., with whom
Stevens, J., joined, concurring); Harlin v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 459, 460 (1979) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 245 (1977) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring); Id, at 246 (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 543 (1975)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 33 n.* (1974) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 461 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Michigan v.
Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 58 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 59 (Marshall J., dissenting);
Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 288 (1972) (Douglas, J., with whom Marshall, J., concurred,
dissenting); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (separate opinion of Harlan,
J.); id. at 713 (Douglas, J., with whom Black, J., concurred, dissenting); Williams v. United
States, 401 U.S. 646, 665 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 19 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814, 817 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in the re-
sult); Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 222 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 255 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 269 (Fortas, J., dissenting);
Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, 82 (1968) (Douglas, J., with whom Black, J., joined, dissent-
ing); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 303 (Black,
J., dissenting); Whisman v. Georgia, 384 U.S. 895 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Tehan v.
United Stated ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 419 (1966) (Black, J., with whom Douglas, J.,
joined, dissenting); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 640 (1965) (Black, J., with whom
Douglas, J., joined, dissenting).
96. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) wherein Chief
Justice Marshall stated:
But if, subsequent to the judgement, and before the decision of the appellate court, a
.law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be
obeyed, or its obligation denied .... In such a case the court must decide according
to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a judgement, rightful when ren-
dered, but which cannot be affirmed but in violation of law, the judgement must be
set aside.
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existing law even if that approach meant setting aside an earlier
decision. The first major United States Supreme Court case in re-
cent years to confront the issue was Linkletter v. Walker.9 7 The
Linkletter Court refused to apply Mapp v. Ohioas to state convic-
tions which had become final prior to the overruling of Wolf v.
Colorado." The Linkletter decision was the first time a majority of
the Supreme Court recognized its power to give constitutional
rules prospective operation. 00 Linkletter was not a purely prospec-
tive decision, however, because it was applied to the litigants at
bar.1'0 The Court denied relief on collateral attack but upheld the
application of Mapp to all cases pending when Mapp was de-
cided.102 Subsequently, it was established that the Linkletter view
of weighing the merits of each case by looking at the history, pur-
pose, and effect on the future operation of the rule, was to be ap-
plied to cases still pending on direct review when a new rule was
announced. 03
97. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
98. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment applies to the
states). The Linkletter Court stated: "In short, we must look to the purpose of the Mapp
rule; the reliance place upon the Wolf doctrine; and the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of Mapp." 381 U.S. at 636.
99. 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (exclusionary rule which applied to federal government also
applied to the states).
100. Although Linkletter was the first case in which a majority articulated a general
power of prospective overruling, individual Justices had suggested that specific decisions be
given limited retroactive effect. Mishkin, The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due
Process of Time and Law, 79 HAav. L. REv. 56, 79 (1962). Mishkin also notes that the
determination whether a "new" rule is applied to cases on direct appeal is a substantially
different question than that raised by a collateral attack. Id.
101. Commonwealth v. Cain, 471 Pa. 140, 189, n.31, 369 A.2d 1234, 1260 n.31 (1977)
(Roberts, J., opinion in support of reversal). Justice Roberts observed:
Prior to the 1964 Supreme Court Term, decisions promulgating new constitutional
rules were applied retroactively as a matter of course to final convictions. While dis-
sents occasionally criticized the Court's failure to discuss the retroactive impact of a
new constitutional rule, the potential effect upon final convictions of any single rule
was not sufficiently acute to justify a departure from the normal grant of
retroactivity.
Id. (quoting Note, Linkletter, Shott, and The Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64 MiCH.
L. Rav. 832 (1966)). See also Mishkin, supra note 100, at 79.
102. 381 U.S. at 626. In approving the application of Mapp to cases not yet final, the
Court simply applied the principle of Schooner Peggy: "Under our cases it appears ... that
a change in law will be given effect while a case is on direct review." 381 U.S. at 627. The
Court also noted that no distinction was made in Schooner Peggy between criminal and civil
litigation. Id.
103. See, e.g., Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (applying
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) to all cases not yet final). See also In re Gaines, 63
Cal. 2d 234, 404 P.2d 473, 45 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1965) where the California Supreme Court
adopted the final judgment rule in determining whether Griffin should be applied to cases
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In subsequent decisions, however, the Supreme Court failed to
apply the Linkletter analysis uniformly. In Johnson v. New
Jersey 04 and Stovall v. Denno'05 the Supreme Court maintained
that in the interest of justice the Court could balance three factors
to determine whether a new constitutional rule should be retroac-
tively applied: (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards,
(b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on
the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of jus-
tice of a retroactive application of the new standards.'"s The
Stovall Court concluded that no distinction was justified between
final convictions, or convictions at various stages of trial and direct
review, because the outcome of the balancing process which
Stovall espoused might call for different degrees of retroactivity in
different cases.'07 Following that decision, the Court's application
of the balancing process resulted in a series of cases that was per-
haps best described by Justice Harlan in his separate opinion in
Mackey v. United States,108 where he commented that the retroac-
tivity doctrine was the product of the Court's disquietude with
rapid changes in the criminal constitutional law area.10 9 Justice
Harlan likened the task of following the post-Linkletter decisions
to tracking "a beast of prey in search of its intended victim."110
At one extreme of this sometimes unintelligible line of cases, the
Court has given complete retroactive effect to 'new constitutional
rules, the major purpose of which is to overcome an aspect of the
criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth finding function
and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty ver-
dicts in past trials.1" In contrast to that position, the Court has
applied some standards only to future cases and denied the benefit
of the new rule even to those parties at bar.' 12 Subsequent to
Stovall, the Court has viewed Stovall as typifying an intermediate
position that applies the new rule retroactively to the parties
pending on direct appeal. Accord People v. Charles, 66 Cal. 2d 330, 425 P.2d 545, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 745 (1967).
104. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
105. 388 U.S. 293 (1967)
106. Id. at 297. See also Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. at 728.
107. 388 U.S. at 300-01. See also Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. at 732.
108. 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
109. Id. at 676 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (plurality opinion). See
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 537.
112. 457 U.S. at 544 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961)).
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before the court but otherwise only to future litigants.113
Amidst this obvious inability of the Court to establish a uniform
policy of retroactivity there was a consistent line of separate opin-
ions that voiced disapproval with selective awards of retroactiv-
ity.1 14 At a minimum, those opinions have contended that all those
defendants whose cases were still pending on direct review at the
time of the law change should enjoy the benefit of the new rule.11 5
Justice Harlan's separate opinion in Mackey, and his dissenting
opinion in Desist are representative of the rationale underlying the
aforementioned opinions disavowing selective awards of retroactiv-
ity.1 16 The comprehensive analysis presented by Justice Harlan
took root in the view that three norms of constitutional adjudica-
tion were transgressed by failing to apply a new rule at least to
cases on direct review.117 Justice Harlan termed the Court's policy
an "ambulatory retroactivity doctrine," which conflicted with his
first norm of constitutional adjudication-"principled decision
making."' 18 The Justice noted that initially the retroactivity doc-
trine was seen by some of the Justices as a way of limiting the
reach of decisions that seemed to them to be fundamentally un-
sound, while other Justices viewed it as providing an impetus for
overdue reforms which otherwise would not be implemented."'
The result, according to Harlan, was that coalitions favoring non-
retroactivity had realigned from case to case generating a welter of
"incompatible rules and inconsistent principles.' 20 The Court, in
Michigan v. Payne,"' implicitly recognized the accuracy of
Harlan's statement when that Court characterized the balancing
process as a "charade."
The second aspect of the adjudication process that Justice
Harlan found to be offended occurred when the Court chose to ap-
113. 457 U.S. at 545 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 301; Michigan v. Payne, 412
U.S. 47, 51 (1973); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 284, 285 (1972) (plurality opinion); De-
Stefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968)).
114. See 457 U.S. at 545 n.9 (citing cases in which Justices Black, Douglas, and Harlan
either dissented or concurred in the result).
115. Id.
116. See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 675 (Harlan, J., dissenting and concurring); Desist, 394
U.S. at 256 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
117. See 457 U.S. at 546 (citing 401 U.S. at 675).
118. See 457 U.S. at 546 (citing 401 U.S. at 681).
119. 401 U.S. at 676 (citing Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 (1969)).
120. 457 U.S. at 546 (quoting Desist, 394 U.S. at 258).
121. 412 U.S. 47 (1973). The Payne Court stated: "principled adjudication requires the
Court to abandon the charade of carefully balancing countervailing considerations when de-
ciding the question of retroactivity." Id. at 61.
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ply a new rule entirely prospectively save only with respect to the
particular litigants whose case was chosen as the vehicle for estab-
lishing that rule."'2 In Mackey, Harlan eloquently articulated the
criticism of that position, likening it to fishing one case out of a
stream of cases on appeal; thus, by its very arbitrariness, it of-
fended legitimate judicial review. s
Finally, Justice Harlan contended that ambulatory retroactivity
compromised the principle of treating similarly situated defen-
dants the same."2 ' Justice Harlan indicated that one simple rule
was needed to eliminate the confusion and vacillation of the Court,
and that the most appropriate one was the proposition set forth in
Linkletter.'2 5 The United States Supreme Court in United States
v. Johnson most recently discussed Justice Harlan's views and
agreed with him that retroactivity must be rethought while deter-
mining that a decision of the Court construing the fourth amend-
ment was, subject to certain exceptions, to be applied retroactively
to all convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision
was rendered. 2
It is interesting to note that the Geschwendt court, when con-
fronted with the determination in Johnson, chose to look at John-
son not only as not controlling a state court's determination in this
matter, but also distinguished it on more substantive grounds.12 7
122. 457 U.S. at 546-47.
123. 401 U.S. at 678-79. Justice Harlan stated: "Simply fishing one case from the
stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional stan-
dards, then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that
new rule constitutes an indefensible departure from this model of judicial review." Id.
124. 394 U.S. at 258-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan noted:
[W]hen another similarly situated defendant comes before us, we must grant the
same relief or give a principled reason for acting differently. We depart from this
basic judicial tradition when we simply pick and choose from among similarly situ-
ated defendants those who alone will receive the benefit of a "new" rule of constitu-
tional law.
Id.
125. 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Harlan stated: "I
have concluded that Linkletter was right in insisting that all 'new' rules of constitutional
law must, at a minimum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject to direct review
by this Court at the time the new decision is handed down." Id. Similarly, in Mackey Jus-
tice Harlan stated: "[A] proper perception of our duties as a court of law, charged with
applying the Constitution to resolve every legal dispute within our jurisdiction on direct
review, mandates that we apply the law as it is at the time, not as it once was." 401 U.S. at
681 (Harlan, J., concurring).
126. 457 U.S. at 537 (quoting Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Desist, 394 U.S. at
258).
127. 500 Pa. at 127, 130, 454 A.2d at 995, 996. The Johnson Court placed two limita-
tions on its position, according to the Geschwendt plurality. The Geschwendt court noted:
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Thus, the circumstances in Geschwendt brought the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court face to face with an old nemesis-retroactivity
as to cases on direct appeal when a rule change was effectuated. In
this instance, the issue of a proper jury charge provided a challeng-
ing and perplexing context within which an attempt was made to
resolve a most troublesome area of the law. The struggle that took
place in Geschwendt and its antecedents merely reflects the tumul-
tuous history of this concept in the Supreme Court and Pennsylva-
nia courts. Recently, in Commonwealth v. Brown,12 s it appeared
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had provided an unequivo-
cal statement that fairness demanded that relief be granted not
only to that litigant who successfully challenges a rule of law, but
also to those cases pending on direct appeal which suffer from the
same infirmity.'
Reviewing the lower court's determination in Brown, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court called for a retroactive application of Mul-
grew for those cases still on direct review at the time of the Mul-
grew decision.13 0 The Brown court looked to its recent decisions in
First, the view of the Johnson majority affording retrospective application to matters
then on direct appeal related to decisions that were constitutionally compelled, spe-
cifically in that case Fourth Amendment violations. Here we are concerned with
merely a change in state practice; there was [sic] no constitutional overtones in our
decision to set aside the Gable view, but rather our decision in Mulgrew represented
an exercise of our supervisory authority. The argument of the necessity of decision-
making consistency in the application of constitutionally compelled decisions loses its
force when removed from the constitutional setting.
Second, even where the decision was constitutionally mandated, the Johnson ma-
jority concluded that where the new rule represents "a clear break with the past,"
nonretroactive application is indicated.
Id. at 130, 454 A.2d at 996-97 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
128. 494 Pa. 380, 431 A.2d 905 (1981).
129. Id. at 381-82, 431 A.2d at 906. Appellant Brown was tried on charges of murder
and voluntary manslaughter and found guilty by a jury of murder of the second degree.
Brown raised the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity and requested that the jury be
instructed as to the consequences of such a verdict. He renewed that request after the pros-
ecution's closing argument, during which the prosecutor may have led the jury to believe
that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity would result in release of the defendant
("If you believe that Melvin Brown didn't know what he was doing when he was up in that
room, well then put him out in the street"). Id. at 382, 431 A.2d at 906. The court refused to
grant the requested instruction. The jury in Brown returned a guilty verdict only nine days
prior to the decision in Mulgrew. The trial court also denied Brown's post-trial motion urg-
ing application of the Mulgrew decision. The trial court opined that a new trial was not
indicated since Mulgrew was decided after completion of Brown's trial. Id. at 382, 431 A.2d
at 906.
130. 494 Pa. at 383-85, 434 A.2d at 906-07 (citing August v. Stasak, 492 Pa. 550, 556,
424 A.2d 1328, 1331 (1981) (since no distinction can be drawn between appellants and the
injured party in Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977), the same
relief should be available, and thus a party whose case is pending on direct appeal is entitled
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several cases of both a criminal and civil nature for guidance.1 31
The Brown court recognized that retroactivity was perhaps more
important in the criminal setting where one's fundamental rights
of life and liberty were at stake.13 2 The court unequivocally
adopted the rationale of United States v. Schooner Peggy which
stated that a court must apply the law as it exists at the time of its
decision and it does not have the power to enforce a law which is
no longer valid.'
The Brown court predicated its decision to apply Mulgrew retro-
actively solely on the soundness of the Mulgrew decision and its
importance to an accused, and not based on any sort of
prosecutorial misconduct, although that issue was raised by trial
counsel." Demonstrative of the fact that the Brown court inde-
pendently embraced the concept of retroactive application of Mul-
grew, was Justice Nix's concurring opinion. "e Justice Nix opined
that the prosecutor's misleading remarks to the jury were sufficient
to necessitate clarification, vis-a-vis a Mulgrew type instruction
and that the court's discussion of retroactivity was unnecessary to
vacate sentence and remand for a new trial."s6 It is also interesting
to note that Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Kauffman, filed a
dissenting opinion in Brown that foreshadowed the Geschwendt
plurality's reliance on Mulgrew, and the Geschwendt plurality's in-
terpretation that the Mulgrew pronouncement itself was a rule of
criminal procedure unencumbered by constitutional overtones
which might necessitate a retroactive application of Mulgrew.15 7
to the benefit of changes in law which occur before the judgment becomes final); Common-
wealth v. Hill, 492 Pa. 100, 111, 422 A.2d 491, 499 (1980) (opinion in support of reversal)
(jurisprudential principles of judicial power and fairness to litigants mandate application on
direct appeal of an intervening change in the law even where an objection has not been
interposed at trial and apply equally to both criminal and civil proceedings); Gibson v. Com-
monwealth, 490 Pa. 156, 415 A.2d 80 (1980) (there is no principled reason to discriminate
now against appellants whose causes also accrued before the overruling decision; both clas-
ses of suits affect the Commonwealth in equal measure and therefore must be treated in like
fashion)).
131. 494 Pa. at 384-85, 431 A.2d at 907-08. See supra note 130.
132. 494 Pa. at 385, 431 A.2d at 908.
133. Id. at 384, 431 A.2d at 907 (citing United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 103 (1801)).
134. The issue of prosecutorial misconduct was raised by appellant Brown in his brief
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The court chose not to address that issue, however,
confining itself to the matter of retroactivity of Mulgrew. Brief for Appellant at 19, Com-
monwealth v. Brown, 494 Pa. 380, 431 A.2d 905 (1981).
135. 494 Pa. at 386-87, 431 A.2d at 908 (Nix, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 387, 431 A.2d at 909 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Justice Larsen noted the ma-
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Whether by design or nescience, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
chose the path of least resistance in the disposition of
Geschwendt's appeal, since labelling Mulgrew non-constitutional
effectively circumvented the analysis called for by the United
States Supreme Court in Johnson when deciding retroactive con-
stitutional matters.
13 8
The determination of the Brown court found unquestioned ac-
ceptance. Subsequent to Brown, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
decided Commonwealth v. Hastings, s13  Relying on Brown, the
Hastings court applied Mulgrew retroactively where the defendant
had requested a Mulgrew type instruction and was denied that in-
struction at trial.1 40 Fifteen days after the Hastings jury returned a
guilty verdict, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Mulgrew;
and although the trial court granted Hastings a new trial in light of
Mulgrew, on reargument the court en banc refused to apply Mul-
grew retroactively and denied Hastings' post-trial motions.1 41 The
Commonwealth had argued to the Hastings court that Brown was
not applicable because of the prosecutorial misconduct present in
Brown, but absent in Hastings.1 4 The superior court rejected this
contention, explicitly noting that the Brown majority neither
stated nor implied that the prosecutorial misconduct had a bearing
on the retroactive application of Mulgrew. 4' The Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court in Hastings clearly perceived that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Brown had unequivocally enunciated the view
that when the law is changed while a case is pending on appeal, the
new law must be applied.14 4 Although the holding in Brown was
apparently clear in its wording and subsequent application, the
serpentine character of retroactivity continued to manifest itself.
In Geschwendt the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided to
change its posture and disavow the Brown decision. The
Geschwendt court disapprovingly viewed Brown as embracing a
jority's reliance on what he termed "a completely unrelated civil case" [August v. Stasak,
492 Pa. 550, 424 A.2d 1328 (1981)] and the majority's choice to ignore the effect its ruling
would have on the Commonwealth, its witnesses, the taxpayers and society. 494 Pa. at 387,
431 A.2d at 909 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
138. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 537.
139. 301 Pa. Super. 65, 446 A.2d 1337 (1982).
140. Id. at 66-67, 446 A.2d at 1337-38.
141. Id. at 67, 446 A.2d at 1338.
142. Id. at 67-68, 446 A.2d at 1338.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 68, 446 A.2d at 1338.
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per se application of the Schooner Peggy doctrine. 45 Almost magi-
cally, the Geschwendt court also decided to change the basis of its
decision in Brown. The Geschwendt court stated that the relief af-
forded Brown was justified without the consideration of the retro-
active application of Mulgrew, an obvious reference to the
prosecutorial misconduct which was not relied on by the court. ' 6
Its appears that the plurality engaged in a poorly designed attempt
to state that retroactvity was not really at issue in Brown; this de-
spite their unequivocal language to the contrary. Earlier, in a re-
lated line of jury instruction cases, the most notable of which was
Commonwealth v. Ernst, 47 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pro-
vided the foundation on which the Geschwendt court could apply a
rule change retroactively based on a constitutional-non-constitu-
tional dichotomy. In Ernst, an equally divided court affirmed a
judgment of sentence which was based on the trial court's instruc-
tion that the defendant bears the burden of proving an insanity
defense by a fair preponderance of the evidence. 14 8 Subsequent to
Ernst's trial, the supreme court's decisions in Commonwealth v.
Rose14 and Commonwealth v. Demmitt'50 shifted to the prosecu-
tion the burden of proving a defendant's sanity beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.' 5' The Ernst court indicated that the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court originally had construed Rose and Demmitt to be
founded on state evidentiary law and thus retroactivity was not
constitutionally mandated. 52 Based on the later United States Su-
preme Court decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur,5 3 however, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted Demmitt and Rose to
have constitutional underpinnings. ' Consequently, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court retroactively applied Demmitt to those cases
which had been tried before Rose and Demmitt, but which were
still on direct review at the time of those decisions.'
145. 500 Pa. at 134, 454 A.2d at 999.
146. Id. "It is true that the language of the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in that case
speaks in terms of a retroactive application in Mulgrew in justification of affording relief to
Mr. Brown. However, the facts of the case justified the result reached without requiring a
retrospective application of Mulgrew .... " Id.
147. 476 Pa. 102, 381 A.2d 1245 (1978).
148. Id. at 104-05, 381 A.2d at 1246.
149. 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974).
150. 456 Pa. 475, 321 A.2d 627 (1974).
151. 476 Pa. at 105, 381 A.2d at 1246.
152. Id.
153. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
154. 476 Pa. at 105, 381 A.2d at 1246.
155. 381 A.2d at 1246-47 (citing Commonwealth v. Moyer, 466 Pa. 464, 353 A.2d 447
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Nevertheless, following the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Patterson v. New York, 15" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
availed itself of the Patterson decision and again changed direc-
tions with regard to the retroactivity doctrine. 15 7 The equally di-
vided Ernst court chose to adhere to its initial characterization of
Rose and Demmitt as based on state evidentiary law. 58 Viewing
them as non-constitutionally premised decisions, the Ernst court
stated that Rose and Demmitt were not to be retroactively applied
since the almost uniform practice of the court had been not to ap-
ply non-constitutionally premised criminal law decisions in a non-
(1976); Commonwealth v. Williams, 463 Pa. 370,. 344 A.2d 877 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Simms, 462 Pa. 26, 333 A.2d 477 (1975)).
156. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
157. 476 Pa. at 106, 381 A.2d at 1247 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977) (holding that it was not constitutionally offensive to burden the defendant with prov-
ing his insanity defense)).
158. 476 Pa. at 107, 381 A.2d at 1247 (citing Commonwealth v. Milliken, 450 Pa. 310,
300 A.2d 78 (1973) (rule mandating that sworn oral testimony be reduced to writing in some
acceptable manner when offered in support of the issuance of a search warrant, is not one of
constitutional proportions and thus is wholly prospective)); Commonwealth v. Tarver, 467
Pa. 401, 357 A.2d 539 (1976) (rule of compulsory consolidation for trial of all charges which
are based upon the same conduct or arise from the same criminal episode or transaction is a
procedural rule which is not constitutionally based and thus applied prospectively); Com-
monwealth v. Davis, 466 Pa. 102, 351 A.2d 642 (1976) (PA. R. CRIM. P. 2003 mandating that
magistrates determine probable cause from written documents exclusive of oral testimony is
not constitutionally required and is applied prospectively only); Commonwealth v. Jones,
457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142 (1974) (under Pennsylvania Supreme Court's supervisory power
that defendant under murder indictment is entitled upon request to have the jury advised
of its power to return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter, but relief need not be given to
defendant since he suffered no prejudice from a refusal of such instruction); Commonwealth
v. Fowler, 451 Pa. 505, 304 A.2d 124 (1973) (ruling that if post trial proceedings in a case of
first degree murder are not disposed of and that defendant is not sentenced within the
stated four month period, he may then apply for bail, is not founded upon a constitutional
premise and is an exercise of court's supervisory powers, thus it is to be wholly prospective);
Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 441 Pa. 17, 271 A.2d 497 (1970) (decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Meyers, 402 Pa. 451, 167 A.2d 295
(1961) (relating to instructions as to presumptions in homicide cases, and later disapproved
in part, was not to be applied retroactively)); Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 399 Pa. 110, 160
A.2d 215 (1960) (where the court clearly and distinctly set forth that a rule regarding jury
instructions on the subject of alibi was to be prospective only, there was to be no retroactive
application); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 230 Pa. Super. 386, 326 A.2d 623 (1974) (in modify-
ing the judgment of sentence, the court used its supervisory powers to limit the kinds of
offenses that can be introduced for impeachment and such limitation is not retroactive);
Commonwealth v. Williams, 232 Pa. Super. 339, 331 A.2d 875 (1974) (defendant's knowledge
of his right to participate in the selection of jury panel was not of constitutional proportions
demanding retroactive application); Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa. 406, 322 A.2d 102
(1974) (decision in Commonwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 286 A.2d 638 (1971), with respect to
convictions in state court of person convicted and sentenced in federal court for the same
offense, could be relied on on direct appeal by defendant whose prosecution was initiated
before the date of such decision).
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retroactive manner." 9 The vacillation in this area, and the problem
created by the retroactivity issue was even further illustrated by
the Ernst court's consideration of inequality and unfairness of the
retroactivity issue which was created by the court's own fence
jumping. 160 Justice Pomeroy, authoring the opinion in support of
affirmance, noted that several defendants had trials prior to the
decisions in Rose and Demmitt, and received the benefit of those
decisions while their cases were on direct appeal.'61 He stated that
it would be inequitable to change courses at that time and deny
relief to those persons similarly situated since those judgments
were not yet final. 62 Thus, the court espoused a limited measure of
retroactivity for the Rose and Demmitt decisions.1
6 3
The Ernst court went further and, speaking in what might best
be described as a doctrinal waiver tone, determined that appellant
Ernst was not similarly situated to those defendants who had pre-
served the issue for appellate review by raising it at the trial
level.' The court based that notion on the fact that Ernst brought
the instructional matter to issue for the first time on appeal. 6 5
Thus, the court ultimately denied Ernst retroactive application of
the decisions in Rose and Demmitt because of his failure to prop-
erly raise any objection to the trial court's charge at the proper
time. 66 Implicit in this reasoning is the notion that had Ernst
raised the issue at trial he would have then received the benefit of
a retroactive application of the Rose and Demmitt decisions. The
court's discomfort with basing its decision solely on retroactivity
was obvious in this defensive posture taken by the plurality in ex-
plaining the applicability of waiver rationale that rendered Ernst
not to be similarly situated. The Ernst court recognized the well-





164. Id. The court stated:
Our rules of criminal procedure, reflecting sound jurisprudential considerations, pro-
vide that an appellant may not assign as error a portion of the charge to a jury or an
omission therefrom unless specific objection is made before the jury retires to deliber-
ate . . . . This is reflective of the elementary principle that an appellate court does
not review issues raised for the first time on appeal.
Id. at 106-07, 381 A.2d at 124. Regarding the principle of waiver, see generally Common-
wealth v. Gravely, 486 Pa. 194, 404 A.2d 1296 (1979); Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31,
331 A.2d 213 (1975).
165. 476 Pa. at 107, 381 A.2d at 1247.
166. Id. at 107-08, 381 A.2d at 1247.
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established principle that the reasons supporting a limitation of
appellate review to points which have been properly preserved be-
low are absent when the unasserted proposition is not in being at
the time of trial.16 7 Justice Pomeroy utilized the constitu-
tional-non-constitutional dichotomy to preclude the application
of the aforementioned principle to Ernst's circumstances. 6 8 He
opined that there were different considerations involved with a
non-constitutional claim, and that in such an instance a defendant
was precluded from raising on appeal a non-constitutional legal
principle newly announced in an appellate decision rendered sub-
sequent to the date of his trial.'69 Although Justice Pomeroy failed
to specify what those considerations were, or at least more fully
explain how they applied to Ernst, he illustrated the dichotomy
and its application by referring to the pre-Rose decision of Com-
monwealth v. Cropper,70 where the court based its decision on ap-
pellant's failure to preserve his claim at trial or in post-trial mo-
tions.17 ' Waiver aside, however, the most important aspect of the
Ernst decision was the court's development and explicit acknowl-
edgement of the constitutional-non-constitutional dichotomy
which was later relied on by both the Pennsylvania Superior Court
and Supreme Court when appellant Geschwendt presented his
claim. 72
The reasoning of the equally divided Ernst court became the
very foundation for the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in
Geschwendt.17 ' Noting that Geschwendt had requested a retroac-
tive application of Mulgrew, the Pennsylvania Superior Court con-
veniently relied on the dichotomy espoused in Ernst, coupled with
its contention that there was no constitutional issue involved in
167. Id. at 108, 381 A.2d at 1248 (citing Commonwealth v. Simon, 446 Pa. 215, 285
A.2d 861 (1971); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 433 Pa. 195, 249 A.2d 307 (1969); Common-
wealth v. Cheeks, 429 Pa. 89, 239 A.2d 793 (1968); Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222
A.2d 897 (1966)).
168. 476 Pa. at 108, 381 A.2d at 1248.
169. Id.
170. 463 Pa. 529, 345 A.2d 645 (1975).
171. 476 Pa. at 108, 381 A.2d at 1248. (citing Cropper, 463 Pa. at 536, 345 A.2d at
648). Cropper predated Rose and Demmitt. At trial, Cropper's counsel admitted that he
bore the burden of proving self defense by a preponderance of the evidence and he did not
object to that standard at trial or in post-trial motions. Despite its inconsistency with Rose
and Demmitt (decided while Cropper was within the appellate process), the Cropper court
based it decision on the premise that Cropper waived the claim because of his failure to
properly preserve it. 463 Pa. at 536, 345 A.2d at 648.
172. 454 A.2d 991. See 271 Pa. Super. 102, 412 A.2d 595.
173. See 271 Pa. Super. at 105, 412 A.2d at 597.
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Mulgrew, to dispose of Geschwendt's claim summarily.1 7'
Geschwendt again raised the constitutional implications of a Mul-
grew instruction before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but
again did not find a receptive ear.'7 ' The plurality in Geschwendt
relied on Ernst only insofar as relying entirely on the retroactivity
issue-Geschwendt's preservation of his claim apparently was not
at issue. Perhaps the court felt secure enough in its position on
retroactivity that it felt no obligation to look to, or rely upon, the
waiver doctrine as it had done earlier in Ernst, and more recently
in Commonwealth v. Hernandez. 17  The Hernandez court, without
discussing the constitutional or non-constitutional aspects of retro-
activity, recognized that fairness dictated the applicability of the
newly announced principle of law to all similarly situated litigants,
and application should not depend on a race to the courthouse-if
the accused properly preserves his claim.177
Because of its past reliance and emphasis on waiver, it may have
been somewhat of a surprise to both litigants that the court did
not consider waiver to be of moment. The first matter that appel-
lant Geschwendt brought to the attention of the supreme court in
his brief was the assertion that he had preserved the issue of the
Mulgrew instruction for appellate review.17 8 Conversely, in its re-
174. Id. The superior court stated:
The defendant urges that we apply the Mulgrew decision retroactively. We hereby
decline to do so because many cases have held that new decisions will not apply retro-
actively unless they involve constitutional issues. We see no constitutional issue in-
volved in Mulgrew, and will therefore not apply that decision retroactively in this
case. The trial court's charge was therefore proper.
Id. (citations omitted).
175. Brief for Appellant at 27, Commonwealth v. Geschwendt, 500 Pa. 120, 454 A.2d
991 (1983). Geschwendt brought this claim as colorable under his due process right to a fair
trial. Id.
176. 498 Pa. 405, 446 A.2d 1268 (1982). The Hernandez court held that the fact that
an arrest preceded the judicial decisions giving rise to the McCutheon doctrine (an accused
under eighteen years of age may not effectively waive his constitutional rights against self-
incrimination and the right to counsel without benefit of a concerned, informed adult, see
Commonwealth v. McCutheon, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669, cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1975)),
did not preclude application of the rule to an appellant whose direct appeal was pending at
the time of those decisions. 498 Pa. at 405, 446 A.2d at 1270-71.
177. 498 Pa. at 411, 446 A.2d at 1271 (citing Commonwealth v. Hill, 492 Pa. 100, 111,
422 A.2d 491, 497 (1980) (Roberts, J., opinion in support of reversal); Commonwealth v.
Cain, 471 Pa. 140, 167, 369 A.2d 1234, 1248 (1977) (Pomeroy, J., opinion in support of
affirmance)).
178. Brief for Appellant at 11, Commonwealth v. Geschwendt, 500 Pa. 120, 454 A.2d
991 (1983). Geschwendt maintained that he had preserved the issue by-
(a) specifically requesting the trial judge to instruct the jury as to the consequences of
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity;
(b) raising the issue in timely filed post verdict motions;
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ply brief, the Commonwealth strongly contested Geschwendt's con-
tention that he had preserved the issue for appellate considera-
tion. 9 Thus, the Geschwendt court had an adequate framework to
decide the case by application of the waiver doctrine as it had done
earlier in Ernst and Hernandez.
Nevertheless, the Geschwendt plurality chose to ignore the
waiver issue, instead choosing to engage in an extensive discussion
of retroactivity and determined the case on that basis. Perhaps the
mere fact that the court chose to treat the retroactivity issue is
implicit acknowledgment that Geschwendt had properly preserved
the issue for appellate review. Alternatively, it might be conjec-
tured that the court was dissatisfied with its posture in deciding
this type of case, and that Geschwendt, in its mind, presented the
right circumstance to fully articulate the proper evaluation to be
undertaken when such an issue arises. In this respect, Geschwendt
presented an ill-conceived framework to articulate a more defini-
tive standard based on a constitutional-non-constitutional di-
chotomy. This is because the Mulgrew instruction cannot conclu-
sively be deemed as not possessing constitutional dimensions. The
constitutional basis of the Mulgrew instruction, though overtly re-
jected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, possesses an undenia-
ble vitality when the court's vacillating posture is clearly
scrutinized.
Waiver not being at issue in Geschwendt, vis-a-vis the court's
disregard of the same, it is indisputable that the Geschwendt plu-
rality had to explicitly overrule Brown to reach a decision couched
(c) raising the issue in the defendant's brief;
(d) filing a petition to supplement defendant's brief insofar as the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court had decided Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, subsequent to the filing of de-
fendant's brief;
(e) said supplemental brief being filed prior to the decision of the lower court on
appellant's post-trial motions and affording them ample opportunity to rule on the
issue.
Id.
179. Brief for the Appellee, Commonwealth v. Geschwendt, 500 Pa. 120, 454 A.2d 991
(1983). The Commonwealth maintained that Geschwendt failed to conform to the require-
ments of PA. R. CaiuM. P. 1123(a), which provides that issues not presented in motions for a
new trial will not be considered by the appellate court. The Commonwealth contended the
appellant did not specifically raise the Mulgrew.type charge, but that it was only one of
twenty-one points for charge appellant had requested. Thus where appellant stated in his
post-trial motions that "it was error to refuse the defendant's points for charge at both the
verdict and penalty stages of the trial" and "it was error to overrule the defendant's excep-
tions to the court's instructions to the jury," the Commonwealth characterized such motions
as "boilerplate" and effectively waived. Brief for Appellee, Commonwealth v. Geschwendt,
500 Pa. 120, 454 A.2d 991 (1983).
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in terms of retroactivity since Brown unequivocally required retro-
active application of Mulgrew. The Geschwendt court's belated at-
tempt to justify Brown in other terms-prosecutorial misconduct
necessitating a Mulgrew instruction-may be indicative of the fact
that the plurality was ultimately unconvinced of its own analysis
and/or the result it reached. To reach the conceptual framework
desired, the court found it necessary to characterize Brown both as
a per se application of the Schooner Peggy notion of retroactivity,
and also disavow Brown in order to adopt the constitutional-non-
constitutional dichotomy. s0
By adopting the constitutional-non-constitutional dichotomy,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was able to categorize
Geschwendt's claim as non-constitutional and allow that classifica-
tion itself to determine if relief was to be granted. Similarly, that
course of analysis permitted the court to circumvent arguments re-
lating to whether Geschwendt had received a fair trial, since a
Mulgrew-type instruction was not deemed to be a constitutional
imperative. By ensconcing the retroactivity question present in
Geschwendt in the constitutional-non-constitutional dichotomy,
the Geschwendt plurality quickly, but perhaps short-sightedly, dis-
posed of the case, effectively ignoring the possibility that
Geschwendt had not enjoyed a fair trial."1
The manner in which the Geschwendt plurality had to construe
Mulgrew bears this contention out. The Geschwendt plurality
termed the determination in Mulgrew to be an exercise of the
court's supervisory powers and thus not constitutionally com-
pelled.18 2 The Mulgrew court, however, did not indicate that their
decision was such an exercise of supervisory powers and therefore
without constitutional dimensions. In fact, a closer scrutinization
of the Mulgrew rationale belies such a contention. The unanimous
Mulgrew court, in assessing the import of the necessity to inform
the jury of the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity, explicitly adopted the reasoning of Lyles v. United
States5" and the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Common-
180. 500 Pa. at 129-30, 134, 454 A.2d at 996, 999.
181. Id. at 131, 454 A.2d at 997. Referring to Mulgrew, the plurality stated that "Mul-
grew was not a change fashioned to correct a serious flaw in the fact-finding process but
rather represented a refinement in our practice. While the change is expected to enhance
the process, its prospective application would not reflect an erosion of our committment to
provide a fair trial." Id. at 132, 454 A.2d at 997.
182. Id. at 130, 454 A.2d at 996.
183. 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (where defendant pleads not guilty by reason of
insanity, jury has a right to know meaning of verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity as
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wealth v. Mutina.1s4 Although retroactivity was not at issue in ei-
ther of those cases, both of those courts concluded that the conse-
quences of an acquittal by reason of insanity should be presented
to the jury, thus providing the Mulgrew court with a firm basis to
change the law of Pennsylvania. The language of both Mutina and
Lyles indisputably sounded in terms of the courts' concern that a
defendant receive a fair trial. The Mulgrew court in fact quoted
directly from Mutina5 s and Lyles'5 6 in its opinion. The Mulgrew
court indicated that such an instruction would reduce the possibil-
ity of compromise verdicts occasioned by a jury's misapprehension
that they would be acquitting a defendant by reaching a verdict of
accurately as it knows by common knowledge the meaning of verdict of guilty and verdict of
not guilty), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 943 (1960), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 992 (1962).
184. 366 Mass. 810, 323 N.E.2d 294 (1975) (where the defense of insanity is fairly
raised the defendant upon timely request is entitled to an instruction regarding the conse-
quences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity).
185. 475 Pa. at 277, 380 A.2d at 352. The Mulgrew court adopted the following state-
ment of the Mutina court:
The instant case represents a classic example of the injustice which may occur
when such information is withheld from the jury. The jury could have had no doubt
that the defendant killed Miss Achorn. The jury also heard overwhelming persuasive
evidence that the defendant was insane at the time of the killing and that, for a long
time into the future, he will remain a menace to himself and to society. Foremost in
their minds must have been a concern for the safety of the community.
In the absence of an instruction from the trial judge as to the effect of a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity, the jurors sought to render justice both to the defen-
dant and to society, but theirs was not a true verdict.
Id. (quoting Mutina, 366 Mass. at 810, 323 N.E.2d at 301-02).
186. 475 Pa. at 275, 380 A.2d at 351 (quoting Lyles, 254 F.2d at 728). The language
quoted by the Mulgrew court was as follows:
This point arises under the doctrine, well established and sound, that the jury has
no concern with the consequences of a verdict, either in the sentence, if any, or the
nature or extent of it, or in probation. But we think that doctrine does not apply in
the problem before us. The issue of insanity having been fairly raised, the jury may
return one of three verdicts, guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity.
Jurors, in common with people in general, are aware of the meanings of verdicts of
guilty and not guilty. It is common knowledge that a verdict of not guilty means that
the prisoner gots free and that a verdict of guilty means that he is subject to such
punishment as the court may impose. But a verdict of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity has no such commonly understood meaning. As a matter of fact, its meaning
was not made clear in this jurisdiction until Congress enacted the statute of August 9,
1955. It means neither freedom nor punishment. It means the accused will be con-
fined in a hospital for the mentally ill until the superintendent of such hospital certi-
fies, and the court is satisfied, that such person has recovered his sanity and will not
in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others. We think the jury has a
right to know the meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it knows by com-
mon knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts.
Id. at 275-76, 380 A.2d at 351.
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not guilty by reason of insanity.'87
Despite this extensive discussion in Mulgrew that, at the very
least, implicitly contained constitutional overtones, the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court in Geschwendt offered little explanation for
the proposition that entitlement to a Mulgrew charge is not a mat-
ter of constitutional dimensions.188 After relying initially on the
unsupported assertion that Mulgrew simply was an exercise in su-
pervisory authority, the Geschwendt court alternatively contended
that even if Mulgrew were constitutionally compelled, it was a
clear break with the past calling for nonretrospective applica-
tion.18 9 By so doing, the Geschwendt court opened a Pandora's
box, which unmasked the short-sightedness of its decision-making
rationale. This is glaringly apparent since, even within the alterna-
tive framework, the court again avoided the merits of the claim by
aborting its analysis, relying on a superficial and tenuous Stovall
analysis.
190
It is not as though the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not
struggled with the issue of retroactivity and jury instructions in
the past. In fact the decision-making inconsistency and contro-
versy thereto was perhaps a factor in the court's choice to avoid
the more challenging issue raised but not addressed by the
Geschwendt plurality.
In Commonwealth v. Jones 9' the court determined that a trial
judge, upon request, must instruct the jury on its power to return a
verdict of voluntary manslaughter even where the evidence
presented does not provide a basis for finding passion or adequate
provocation. 19 The Jones court did not struggle over that ultimate
determination, but it was equally divided over whether the ruling
should be given prospective or retroactive application. 93 The
Jones opinion in support of reversal, authored by Justice Roberts,
in which Justices Pomeroy and Manderino joined, restated the
concerns voiced by those same three justices in Commonwealth v.
Davis.'" In Davis, Justice Pomeroy stated that because the choice
of whether to charge voluntary manslaughter was left to the discre-
187. 475 Pa. at 276, 380 A.2d at 352.
188. 500 Pa. at 131, 454 A.2d at 997.
189. Id.
190. Id. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
191. 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142 (1974).
192. Id. at 573-74, 319 A.2d at 148.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 563, 319 A.2d at 151 (citing Commonwealth v. Davis, 449 Pa. 468, 479, 297
A.2d 817, 818 (1972)).
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tion of the trial judge with no objective standards to guide that
decision, the practice offended due process and equal protection of
the laws because similarly situated individuals were treated differ-
ently.' 95 As in Geschwendt, retroactivity was the divisive and dis-
puted issue in Jones. The opinion in support of affirmance au-
thored by Justice Nix, in which Justices Eagen and O'Brien joined,
explicitly noted that the court was acting under its supervisory
power and that the rule announced in Jones was to be given only
prospective application."' This prospective application was predi-
cated upon the determination that Jones had not suffered any
prejudice from the absence of the charge.197 The Jones opinion in
support of aflirmance found it unnecessary to consider constitu-
tional arguments. The court relied on the harmless error doctrine
enunciated in Chapman v. California'" to dispose of Jones' claim
to the instruction. 99 Thus, even though Jones was the party at bar
when the rule change was announced, he nevertheless did not re-
ceive the benefit of the change. The opinion in support of reversal
authored by Justice Roberts criticized the result reached insofar as
it failed to address constitutional aspects, but instead relied on a
novel articulation of the harmless error theory to attain the desired
result.200
Just as it might be said that the Geschwendt court chose the
path of least resistance by hanging its decisional hat on the consti-
tutional-non-constitutional dichotomy, so too it might be said
that the Jones court provided the Geschwendt court with a perfect
example of avoiding ultimate constitutional issues, as Jones did
vis-a-vis the harmless error theory.
Jones surfaced again in Commonwealth v. Cain,0 ' wherein
retroactivity and the constitutional-non-constitutional dichotomy
195. 457 Pa. at 563, 319 A.2d at 151.
196. Id. at 573-74, 319 A.2d at 142.
197. Id. at 574, 319 A.2d at 148. The Jones court stated:
It is clear in this case that appellant did not suffer prejudice from the refusal of such
an instruction in view of the jury's decision to ignore their right to return a verdict of
second degree. There is not the slightest reason to believe that the jury would have
returned a verdict of voluntary manslaughter out of sympathy or in recognition of
factors that they may have deemed mitigating where these factors were not suffi-
ciently compelling to cause them to elect the lesser alternative that was offered.
Id.
198. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
199. 457 Pa. at 574 n.16, 319 A.2d at 148 n.16.
200. Id. at 580, 319 A.2d at 151.
201. 471 Pa. 140, 369 A.2d 1234 (1977).
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produced yet another equally divided court. 02 Justice Eagen,
joined by Chief Justice Jones and Justice Pomeroy, writing the
opinion in support of affirmance, considered the retroactivity issue
and the propriety of extending a jury instruction to one who was
on direct review at the time of the change. 03
Subsequent to Jones, but before Cain, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in United States ex rel. Matthews v. Johnson' 4 deter-
mined that the practice abolished in Jones was violative of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution.20 6 Appellant Cain complained that the trial court
erred in refusing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter as
he requested. 0 6 Since Cain's trial antedated both Jones and Mat-
thews, it might have appeared to the Cain court that the Third
Circuit had waivered sufficiently, as to the applicability of Mat-
thews to those cases on direct review, to provide the Cain court
with the leeway to take the retroactivity issue wherever the court
desired. That decisional leeway seems to lead to the often times
surreal, and at least arbitrary, decision-making that occurs in this
area of the law. Cain further demonstrates the long existing tur-
moil in this area which seems unabated given Hernandez, Brown
and Geschwendt.
Besides determining that the rule of Jones was constitutionally
required, the Cain court also determined that it was not to be ap-
plied wholly retroactively but only so far as to those cases on direct
review, in accordance with United States v. Zirpolo.207 Subse-
quently, in United States ex rel. Cannon v. Johnson,20 8 a Third
Circuit panel indicated that Matthews did not apply to cases still
on direct appeal but only to cases in which the trial commenced
subsequent to Matthews. 0' The Third Circuit explained this
change of position in terms of the intervening United States Su-
202. Id. at 142, 369 A.2d at 1236.
203. Id.
204. 503 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1974).
205. Id. at 346. In Matthews, the court reasoned that a jury had the inherent power to
return a voluntary manslaughter verdict on a murder indictment in Pennsylvania. Conse-
quently, the lack of standards for the trial courts to determine whether to charge the jury on
voluntary manslaughter resulted in a fundamentally unfair practice because every defen-
dant was subject to the whim and caprice of the individual judges. Id.
206. 471 Pa. at 158, 369 A.2d at 243 (citing United States v. Zirpolo, 450 F.2d 424 (3d
Cir. 1971) (retroactive application of rule requiring instruction for voluntary manslaughter
to cases on direct appeal if instruction request was proper and timely)).
207. 450 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1971). See 471 Pa. at 158, 369 A.2d at 243.
208. United States ex rel. Cannon v. Johnson, 536 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1976).
209. 471 Pa. at 158, 369 A.2d at 1243 (citing 536 F.2d 1013).
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preme Court decision in Daniel v. Louisiana.2 1 Cannon affirmed
an earlier district court decision in the same case as to retroactivity
in collateral attacks, and followed in dictum the district court's de-
cision that Matthews was not to be applied to cases on direct ap-
peal as was suggested by Matthews itself 2 1 ' In light of the Third
Circuit's waivering and seemingly unpredictable decision making
process, Justice Eagen, in Cain, decided to give effect to the opin-
ion in Cannon and not apply Matthews to cases on direct
appeal. 12
Justice Eagen deemed Matthews to be a new rule of criminal
procedure which was constitutionally required.213 But his opinion
went on to consider Matthews in the context of the Stovall factors
and ultimately determine that: (1) the purpose of Matthews was
not to enhance the truth finding process; (2) there was considera-
ble reliance by the Commonwealth; (3) a horrendous burden would
be placed on the administration of justice if the court called for
retroactive application; and (4) the Third Circuit had ruled that
Matthews need not be applied to collateral attacks, and no distinc-
tion as to cases on direct review was justified.2 4 Thus it was held
in Cain that constitutional considerations did not mandate appli-
cation of Matthews to cases on direct review.2" The Cain court
210. 471 Pa. at 159, 369 A.2d at 1243 (citing Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31 (1975)).
Daniel held that Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (unconstitutional method of jury
selection) was to be applied only to trials after the decision in Taylor was announced. 420
U.S. at 32.
211. 471 Pa. at 159, 369 A.2d at 1243 (citing United States ex rel. Cannon v. Johnson,
396 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Pa. 1975)).
212. 471 Pa. at 159-60, 369 A.2d at 1244. Justice Eagen noted the following reasons for
giving Cannon effect:
(1) it represents the Third Circuit Court's most recent expression on the subject;
(2) it represents a view which had the benefit of Daniel which is in conflict with
Zirpolo;
(3) although it is only a panel decision, Rule 35 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure,
28 U.S.C.A. Rule 35, provides a procedure whereby a majority of the Third Circuit
could have sua sponte caused a rehearing by the court en banc had a majority
thought the proceeding in Cannon involved a "question of exceptional importance"
and had "consideration by the full court .[been thought] necessary to secure or main-
tain uniformity of its decisions." 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 35. In light of Zirpolo being im-
pliedly overruled by Cannon, it is difficult to imagine a more appropriate case requir-
ing uniformity. Yet no rehearing en bane was ordered; and,
(4) it presents a complete understanding of both the purpose to be served by charging
the jury on voluntary manslaughter absent evidence to support such a verdict and the
considerations and ramifications of applying Matthews to direct appeals.
Id. at 160, 369 A.2d at 1244.
213. 471 Pa. at 161, 369 A.2d at 1244.
214. Id. at 161-62, 369 A.2d at 1245 (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)).
215. 471 Pa. at 161-67, 369 A.2d at 1245-47.
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additionally analyzed the question of whether Matthews should
apply to cases on direct appeal pursuant to their supervisory
power." 6 The court declined such an application, noting that: (1)
new rules of procedure have been applied in a wholly prospective
manner in Pennsylvania; 17 (2) the rule of Matthews, whether con-
stitutional or not, was still procedural and did not affect the truth
finding function; 18 (3) in the exercise of its supervisory powers the
rule of Matthews announced in Jones did not inure to the benefit
of Jones;2 19 (4) prior decisions indicated that absent an effect on
the truth finding function, new rules of criminal procedure are not
to be applied to cases on direct review;2 0 and (5) persuasive and
controlling Pennsylvania authority existed for applying Matthews
only where the trial commenced after entry of that decision.22 l
Most important for purposes of analyzing Geschwendt, however,
is the fact that Cain's allegation that the trial court erred in refus-
ing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter was considered
by the court to be one implicating the right to receive a fair trial.2 2
Such was evidenced by the concluding remarks of Justice Eagen,
who stated that the court was confronted with a new rule of proce-
dure announced regarding the court's supervisory powers. 223 How-
ever, Justice Eagen, went on to state that although the rule pos-
sessed constitutional dimensions, it did not effect the truth finding
process, and thus was to be given wholly prospective application.224
But more importantly, Justice Eagen stated that consideration of
the record demonstrated that Cain had received a fair trial.225 That
comment, and the Mulgrew court's adoption of the rationale of
Lyles and Mutina, belies the assertion of the Geschwendt court
that a lack of a Mulgrew-type charge can so easily be deemed a
non-constitutional concern, and that the constitutional-non-con-
216. Id. at 164, 369 A.2d at 1246.
217. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Geiger, 455 Pa. 420, 316 A.2d 881 (1974); Common-
wealth v. Hayward, 437 Pa. 215, 263 A.2d 330 (1970); Commonwealth v. Godfrey, 434 Pa.
532, 254 A.2d 923 (1969); Commonwealth v. Jordan, 407 Pa. 575, 181 A.2d 310 (1962)).
218. 471 Pa. at 165, 369 A.2d at 1247.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 164, 369 A.2d at 1246 (citing Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968); DeStef-
ano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 301).
221. 471 Pa. at 166, 369 A.2d at 1247 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1974);
United States ex rel. Hughes v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1969); Commonwealth ex
rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196 (1968)).
222. 471 Pa. at 166-67, 369 A.2d at 1247.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 167, 369 A.2d at 1247-48.
225. Id. at 167, 369 A.2d at 1248.
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stitutional dichotomy is a mode of decision making possessing an
unassailable sanctity. Cain would seem to indicate that even after
apparently entertaining a determinative discussion regarding con-
stitutional concerns, the court still can, and did, consider the issue
of whether a fair trial was enjoyed by a defendant. Perhaps that is
the ultimate issue to receive consideration, while the constitu-
tional-non-constitutional dichotomy is merely a step or tool, to be
used as a part of a more complete analysis, and at the very least is
not as neat a package as the Geschwendt court would have one
believe. Certainly, in view of the purpose for adopting a Mulgrew-
type charge in Pennsylvania, a studied consideration of the record,
as contemplated by Cain, at the very least casts doubt on whether
Geschwendt actually received a fair trial. The Geschwendt plural-
ity's alternative explanation, hypothetically viewing Mulgrew as
constitutionally mandated, also seems to indicate an awareness by
the court of the real issue, and at least acknowledges the self-serv-
ing and result-orientated nature of an adjudication based on a
purely constitutional-non-constitutional dichotomy.
In Cain, Justice Roberts, joined by Justices O'Brien and
Manderino, filed a dissenting opinion which foreshadowed his dis-
sent in Geschwendt, strongly suggesting that Cain deserved a new
trial. 26 Justice Roberts not only discussed the constitutional right
to the Jones rule, but he initially discussed at length why the de-
nial of that charge violated the due process provision of the state
and federal constitutions. 2 7 Justice Roberts seemed properly to
take the analysis one step back before moving forward, since he
began his analysis with the simple but poignant comment that the
right to a jury trial is one of the most fundamental rights afforded
an accused, and that a lay group's determination of guilt or inno-
cence depends on their being fully and correctly instructed on
their powers and responsibilities.228 Justice Roberts also noted that
226. Id. at 171, 369 A.2d at 1250 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 172-73, 369 A.2d at 1250-51 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts
adopted the reasoning of United States ex rel. Matthews v. Johnson, which indicated that
"[t]o deny appellee the possibility of a lesser restraint of liberty because of a practice which
permits arbitrary trial court activity is offensive to those settled concepts of due process."
Id. at 178, 369 A.2d at 1254 (quoting 503 F.2d at 345).
228. 471 Pa. at 179-82, 369 A.2d at 1254-55 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (citing Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 317 A.2d
258 (1974) (failure to deliver a full and adequate instruction on reasonable doubt denies the
accused a fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause of U.S. CONST. amend. XIV and
PA. CONST art. I, § 9))). Justice Roberts also noted that "[d]ischarge of the jury's responsi-
bility for drawing appropriate conclusions from the testimony depended upon discharge of
the judge's responsibility to give the jury the required guidance by a lucid statement of
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application of the Stovall factors to jury instructions was some-
what tenuous insofar as those factors did not readily lend them-
selves to the distinct nature of that concern.229
Justice Manderino, although joining in Justice Roberts' dissent
in Cain, further commented that the three Stovall factors could
not be properly used to determine whether an accused was entitled
to the benefit of a newly announced constitutional right, or to the
benefit of a rule newly formulated pursuant to the court's supervi-
sory powers. 3 0 Justice Manderino, in an articulation similar to
that of Justice Roberts regarding a proper jury trial, stated that
the ultimate function of the judicial system is not simply truth-
finding, but justice.2 1 Conversely, the Geschwendt plurality was in
apparent agreement with this, stating that even-handed justice re-
quires the application of a new rule to litigants similarly situ-
ated.23 2 The Geschwendt plurality, however, was able to circum-
vent the "similarly situated" argument by opting for a position of
"true fairness, '2 3 or one that considered the interests of society as
a whole. 34 Those interests were deemed by the Geschwendt plural-
ity to be protected by providing a fair system of justice for all the
citizens of the Commonwealth. 5 The Geschwendt plurality seems
to indicate that the balancing that it calls for somehow can permit
a denial of an accused's right to a fair trial, vis-a-vis a Mulgrew
instruction, while concurrently protecting society's interest in a
fair system of justice. If the history and purpose of the change
from Gable to Mulgrew are reflected in the Mulgrew opinion, then
these two interests, rather than competing interests as suggested
by the Geschwendt court, seem to be complimentary, or in fact the
same.
Perhaps the Geschwendt court failed to grasp the full import of
the Mulgrew decision. At the time Mulgrew was decided, Gable
was long-standing decisional authority in Pennsylvania, and it ap-
relevant legal criteria." 471 Pa. at 179 n.17, 369 A.2d at 1254 n.17 (quoting Bollenbach v.
United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946)). See ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice § 5.11(a), Commentary at 74 (Approved Draft 1972) (standards relating to the function
of the trial judge).
229. 471 Pa. at 196-97, 369 A.2d at 1263-64 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 197-98, 369 A.2d at 1264 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
231. Id.
232. 500 Pa. at 133, 454 A.2d at 998 (citing Hankerson, 432 U.S. 233 (1977); Peltier,
422 U.S. 531 (1975); Mackey, 401 U.S. 667 (1971); Desist, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Hill, 492 Pa.
100 (1978)).





pears that despite the fact that Mulgrew overruled Gable, the
Mulgrew court never precisely defined its rationale for overruling
Gable, save the adoption of the authority cited therein, Lyles v.
United States and Commonwealth v. Mutina
2 38
Given the lack of a specific and articulated rationale for overrul-
ing Gable, the need for a more definite background against which
to judge the subsequent actions and reasoning of the Geschwendt
court becomes apparent. Appellant Mulgrew's brief to the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court reveals that he attacked the viability of Ga-
ble on two grounds.3 First, the contention was urged that section
1311(b) enacted after Gable, had been in long-standing effect and
required that the jury: (1) be informed of the degree of punish-
ment incident to the three degrees of murder so that it would be
influenced by these degrees during its deliberations; and (2) be in-
formed of the effect of acquitting a defendant on the ground of
insanity.2 38 Second, Mulgrew contended that the absence of a
charge indicating the court's authority over a person of unsound
mind was prejudicial and deprived an accused of a fair and impar-
tial trial.23 9 It would seem at some point that the Geschwendt plu-
rality's characterization of the decision in Mulgrew as not constitu-
tionally compelled becomes somewhat strained and possibility
inaccurate, at least in terms of what was addressed in Mulgrew and
how that analysis occurred. The Mulgrew court actually addressed
and resolved both contentions raised by Mulgrew. Since one of
those issues was that of the constitutional right to a fair trial vis-a-
vis due process, it may be fairly argued that the Geschwendt plu-
rality's summary characterization of Mulgrew as not constitution-
ally compelled is ill-conceived and unpersuasive.
Initially, the Mulgrew court stated that the applicable law at the
time of Mulgrew's trial was the Mental Health and Procedures Act
and not the Act of 1860 relied on by Mulgrew.2 10 Despite the fact
that Mulgrew's requested point for charge was erroneous, the court
indicated that he had nevertheless alerted the trial judge to an im-
portant issue in the case,24 ' and thus properly preserved the issue
236. 380 A.2d at 351-52.
237. Brief for Appellant at 19, Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271, 380 A.2d 349
(1977).
238. Id. at 19-20 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1311 (Purdon 1972)).
239. Brief for Appellant at 21, Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271, 380 A.2d 349
(1977).
240. 475 Pa. at 274, 380 A.2d at 350.
241. Id. at 274-75, 380 A.2d at 351 (citing Commonwealth v. Sisak, 436 Pa. 262, 270
n.5, 259 A.2d 428, 432 n.5. (1969)).
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for appellate review. 42 Although this issue of waiver was raised,
and itself often seems to serve at the court's behest, the Mulgrew
court's opinion was in response to the issue of a fair trial or lack
thereof, that was raised by appellant Mulgrew. In fact, in his brief,
Mulgrew cited no authority for his contention that he was denied a
fair trial other than a simple assertion that he was in fact "denied
a fair trial. s2 4 The Mulgrew court on its own initiative provided
the authority, with extensive discussion relevant to the fair trial
issue vis-a-vis Mutina and Lyles. Because of the conscious effort
by the Mulgrew court to address that issue of a fair trial, it would
seem that the Geschwendt court's characterization, noted above, of
Mulgrew as non-constitutionally compelled is tenuous and self-
serving to the extent that it provides a basis for not applying Mul-
grew retroactively to Geschwendt based on the constitu-
tional-non-constitutional dichotomy. The Mulgrew court at no
point indicated that it was exercising its supervisory power in
reaching its determination, and although it did not explicitly deem
its ruling constitutionally compelled, the better view would seem to
indicate that their concern was ultimately directed to the fairness
of Mulgrew's trial and in fact can best be viewed as a direct re-
sponse to Mulgrew's two-pronged brief which emphasized the fair
trial issue.24
Perhaps the strained interpretation of Mulgrew as non-constitu-
tionally compelled manifested itself to the Geschwendt court when
it confronted the resolution of the retroactivity issue as determined
in United States v. Johnson.2 4' The constitutional-non-constitu-
tional dichotomy was relied on by the Geschwendt plurality to pre-
clude the application of Johnson.2"4 The Geschwendt plurality de-
fended its decision by reference to two of the three Stovall
242. 475 Pa. at 275, 380 A.2d at 351.
243. Brief for Appellant at 21, Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271, 380 A.2d 349
(1977). Mulgrew's counsel asserted:
The punishment charge, in the absence of a charge of the court's authority over a
person of unsound mind, is prejudicial and deprived Mulgrew a fair and impartial
trial in that it prevented the jury from deliberating and considering the facts and
consequences thereof in a fair and impartial manner.
Id. at 21.
244. Id.
245. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
246. 500 Pa. at 130, 454 A.2d at 996. Johnson, except where a case would be controlled
by existing retroactivity precedents, called for retroactive application of a Supreme Court
decision construing the fourth amendment to all convictions that were not yet final at the
time the decision was rendered. 457 U.S. at 562.
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factors, 47 which have traditionally been applied where determina-
tion of the retroactivity of a new constitutional rule is at issue. The
plurality approached the question of whether Geschwendt enjoyed
a fair trial through this discussion, relying on the Johnson dis-
sent.2 48 Initially, the plurality opined that Mulgrew was a clear
break with the past which almost invariably called for non-retroac-
tive application, 49 and that once it was determined that the new
rule was unanticipated then the second and third Stovall factors
-reliance, and effect on administration of justice-compelled a
finding of non-retroactivity.2 50
The Geschwendt plurality thus initially explained away the plu-
rality decision in Johnson in terms of the ever available constitu-
tional-non-constitutional dichotomy. Perhaps sensing some dis-
comfort with its characterization of Mulgrew as non-
constitutionally compelled, however, the Geschwendt plurality
went on to propound an alternative argument which implicitly ac-
knowledged that the ultimate issue in Geschwendt was that of a
fair trial.2 "' Looking to the Johnson dissent, the plurality acknowl-
edged that retroactive application was required where the rule
change was directed at an aspect of the criminal trial that impairs
its truth finding function and so raises serious questions about the
accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials. 2 How the plurality could
minimize or ignore the fair trial issue, by terming Mulgrew a re-
finement in practice,253 remains a mystery. This is especially ap-
parent when the language of Lyles and Mutina-explicitly
adopted by the Mulgrew court-is read and viewed with the
Geschwendt plurality's adoption of the Johnson dissent's concern
for the accuracy of guilty verdicts-precisely the concern voiced in
Lyles, Mutina, and ultimately Mulgrew. Yet the Geschwendt plu-
rality maintained that the Johnson dissent's demand for retroac-
tive application of a rule designed to overcome inaccurate verdicts
and impaired truth finding would be effectuated only if Mulgrew
were given prospective application.5 4 It seems more than a bit
247. 500 Pa. at 131, 454 A.2d at 997 (citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531
(1975); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244
(1969)).
248. 500 Pa. at 131-32, 454 A.2d at 997.
249. Id. at 131, 454 A.2d at 997 (citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975)).
250. 500 Pa. at 131, 454 A.2d at 997.






confusing when the Geschwent plurality first embraces Mulgrew,
then denies the constitutional overtones contained in Mulgrew
(vis-a-vis Lyles and Mutina) by deeming it a refinement in prac-
tice, but then goes on to adopt those very same constitutional con-
cerns by invoking the Johnson dissent.5
Even as the plurality argued in the alternative, it presented an
aborted Stovall analysis, maintaining that once it determined that
the new rule was a clear break with the past and unanticipated,
that the second and third Stovall factors-reliance by law enforce-
ment authorities on the old standard and effect on administration
of justice-a finding of prospective application necessarily
followed.2
Exhibiting much the same weakness when purporting Mulgrew
as a refinement in practice, as the plurality attempted to engage in
a Stovall analysis they chose to ignore the fact that Stovall
presents a balancing process of three factors, the first of which is
the purpose to be served by the new standard. 7 It would seem
that the purpose of the Mulgrew decision, as indicated in Lyles
and Mutina was to issue a true and proper verdict-ultimately a
fair trial. No balancing of the three Stovall factors is undertaken
by the Geschwendt plurality. Instead, reliance is placed on author-
ity to the effect that Mulgrew was unanticipated, and as such, the
second and third Stovall factors summarily preclude retroactiv-
ity.2" Thus, while ignoring one of the Stovall factors, and not fully
analyzing the other two (upon which it relied to circumvent ana-
lyzing the purpose of the Mulgrew rule) the plurality short-
sightedly asserts that it has effectively rebutted any application of
Mulgrew even if it were constitutionally compelled. Further, the
plurality, despite implicitly acknowledging otherwise, goes on to
conclude that Mulgrew was not addressed to correct a serious flaw
in the fact finding process but.was only a refinement in practice.
Similarly, without analysis, the plurality was able to circumvent
the comment of the Johnson dissent, which was adopted and
looked to for support by the plurality to preclude retroactivity of
Mulgrew, that retroactive application was required where the accu-
racy of a guilty verdict was in doubt." 9 It is manifestly clear that
255. Id.
256. Id. at 131, 454 A.2d at 997.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Roberts noted:
Yet the opinion's limited analysis of the decision in Commonwealth v. Mulgrew dem-
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the Geschwendt plurality failed to look closely at the Mulgrew de-
cision. While it may be considered that the plurality was merely
arguing the constitutionally compelled aspect in the alternative, it
does not seem that far-fetched that the court's discomfort with the
constitutional-non-constitutional aspect of retroactivity contin-
ued to manifest itself by this spontaneous, yet shallow constitu-
tional analysis. Even when the court attempted the aforemen-
tioned analysis, it avoided a true Stovall analysis by making
several conclusory statements that allowed the court to elude the
actual balancing of Stovall factors. Especially apparent is its disre-
gard for that factor demanding consideration of the purpose of the
new rule.2 60 The Geschwendt plurality's inadequate and self-serv-
ing Stovall analysis certainly seems to cast serious doubts upon the
accuracy of the Geschwendt court's ultimate determination.
In his dissent, Justice Roberts noted that the number of cases in
which the defense of insanity is raised is small; that those on direct
review are even fewer; and that the Mulgrew decision governed
conduct at trial, and does not effect the actions of law enforcement
authorities.2 61 Coupled with the rationale of Lyles and Mutina as
to the purpose of the Mulgrew ruling, it can be readily seen that
the plurality had little choice but to deem Mulgrew an exercise of
its supervisory power, since any legitimate and full analysis en-
gaged in by the court could have very well yielded an opposite
result.
The very notions advanced hereinabove have been recently given
credence by the decision in Commonwealth v. Cabeza.6 2 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court retroactively applied Commonwealth
v. Scott"' in which the court abrogated the rule allowing the Com-
monwealth to introduce prior arrests (as opposed to convictions)
where an accused had placed his character at issue. 64 The Cabeza
majority per Justice Larsen held that where an appellate decision
overrules prior law and announces a new principle, unless the deci-
sion specifically declares the rule to be prospective only, the new
onstrates that the opinion has done little more than summarily conclude that appel-
lant should be denied the right to the application of existing law simply because that
law was established in a case other than appellant's after appellant had unsuccess-
fully requested similar treatment at trial.
Id. at 140, 454 A.2d at 1002 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 142, 454 A.2d at 1003 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
261. Id.
262. 469 A.2d 146 (Pa. 1983).
263. 496 Pa. 188, 436 A.2d 607 (1981).
264. Id. at 196, 197, 436 A.2d 611, 612.
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rule is to be applied retroactively to cases where the issue is prop-
erly preserved at all stages of adjudication including any direct ap-
peal. "6 The Cabeza majority specifically rejected the Common-
wealth's argument that the evidentiary rule established in Scott
was not of constitutional dimensions,2 66 and indicated that simi-
larly situated persons, Scott and Cabeza, should be treated the
same. 67 Interestingly enough, the majority relied on Common-
wealth v. Brown,26 8 quoting its language regarding similarly situ-
ated persons-Brown being the very case debunked by the
Geschwendt plurality " 9 The Cabeza court noted that the only
noteworthy difference between the defendants Scott and Cabeza
was that Scott was argued and decided first.270 Echoing the words
of Justices Marshall and Harlan, 71 Justice Larsen stated that the
question of whether to apply an enlightened rule in favor of a dis-
credited one should not be determined by the fortuity of whose
case first came before the appellate court.7
Perhaps Geschwendt is best characterized as one of those in-
stances where the cart was placed before the horse, the plurality
tried two horses (the constitutional-non-constitutional dichotomy
and the alternative Stovall analysis), neither of which could pull
the cart. Ultimately, Geschwendt has served no higher purpose
than to further demonstrate the inconsistent, result orientated and
perhaps arbitrary, nature of the decision making in this area.2
The constitutional-non-constitutional dichotomy is a convenient
concept, but it lacks the depth of analysis necessary when the con-
cerns raised are of the weight such as those brought to face by
265. 469 A.2d at 148.
266. Id. at 147.
267. Id. at 148.
268. 494 Pa. 380, 385, 431 A.2d 905, 907-08 (1981).
269. See 500 Pa. at 134, 454 A.2d at 999.
270. 469 A.2d at 148.
271. See supra notes 36, 116-120.
272. 469 A.2d at 148.
273. For an interesting treatment of the insanity defense in a different conceptual set-
ting, see Commonwealth v. McCann, 469 A.2d 126 (Pa. 1983). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court there determined that in a prosecution for aggravated assault the trial judge did not
err in failing to give sua sponte, an instruction on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity. Id. Additionally the court stated that although there was broad lan-
guage in Mulgrew that a jury must be instructed concerning the possible psychiatric treat-
ment and committment of the defendant after the return of a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity, that implicit in Mulgrew was the condition that the mandatory aspect is contin-
gent upon an accused's request for that instruction. Id. at 128. Consequently the court de-
nied a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where it found a reasonable basis for trial
counsel's failure to request a Mulgrew-type charge. Id.
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Mulgrew and Geschwendt. The constitutional-non-constitutional
dichotomy only tends to obfuscate the ultimate issue of whether an
accused received a fair trial. Such a characterization, as
Geschwendt aptly illustrates, only allows the court to avoid and
denigrate valid constitutional claims under the guise of a cursory
analysis, and a self-serving but ultimately useless label. The trag-
edy of a result-orientated approach lies, as Geschwendt aptly illus-
trates, with a result which should not have been reached.
Edward J. Borkowski
